Bulletin N°65 2026 German voters in the states of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin were called to the polls on Sunday, September 20, to elect their Landtag (regional parliament). We provide some brief explanations of the results.
The State of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
In the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, located in the northeast of the country, bordering the Baltic Sea and part of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the results show many similarities with those of Saxony-Anhalt, where elections were held two weeks earlier. Compared to 2021, voter turnout increased significantly: 1,024,251 voters (78.11%) in 2026 versus 929,118 voters (70.83%) in 2021 (an increase of 7.28%).
The coalition of outgoing Minister-President Manuela Schwesig (SPD), comprising her party and Die Linke (The Left), another social-democratic party (more on that later), suffered a setback. The SPD garnered 360,393 votes (35.50%) compared to 361,761 (39.59%) in 2021, a loss of 4.09%, and saw its representation drop from 34 to 29 seats (a decrease of five). Its ally, Die Linke, obtained 66,388 votes (6.54%) compared to 90,865 votes (9.94%) in 2021, a loss of 3.50%, and its representation fell from 9 to 5 seats (a decrease of four). This is Die Linke's worst electoral performance in this state since its inception. With an absolute majority of 36 seats required, the outgoing coalition no longer has the capacity to govern the state alone (34 seats in total).
For the other parties in the central bloc, the Greens obtained 57,587 votes (5.67%) compared to 57,548 (6.30%) in 2021, a minimal loss of 0.63%, and their party retained the 5 seats won in 2021, making a broad, three-party coalition to govern the state possible. The pivotal FDP (liberal) party emerged from these elections decimated. It obtained 10,415 votes (1.03%) compared to 52,945 votes (5.79%) in 2021; it failed to reach the 5% threshold and therefore disappeared from the Landtag, as in many other states, losing the 5 seats it won in 2021. The CDU, Chancellor Merz's Christian Democratic party, suffered a similar fate. It obtained 49,629 votes (4.89%) against 121,583 votes (13.30%), a loss of 8.41%; it also failed to reach the 5% threshold and lost all 12 seats it had acquired in 2021. This is the culmination of a series of setbacks over three elections and an unprecedented situation, since for the first time the CDU will not be present in a Landtag.
The main beneficiary of this election is the AfD. This reactionary organization is capitalizing on the widespread discontent in the country with the central bloc, and specifically with the CDU and the Chancellor, particularly due to his hawkish stances and the rise in fuel prices (linked to the refusal to buy Russian oil and gas). It obtained 388,026 votes (38.22%), compared to 152,747 votes (16.72%), a gain of 21.50%, and increased its representation from 14 to 32 seats (an increase of eighteen).
Finally, the BSW, a new left-wing party campaigning for peace and against immigration, did not exist in 2021, it obtained 49,036 votes (4.83%), this does not allow it to enter the Landtag, unlike what happened in Saxony-Anhalt.
Here are some excerpts from what we wrote about the elections in Saxony-Anhalt, which apply perfectly to the election in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.
“ This is not to downplay the danger; the AfD has admirers of Hitler among its activists and leaders. But its very reality is more complex, and it is important to understand what explains this massive vote, making, as in any election, a distinction between the party leaders, its activists, and the voters who chose to cast their ballots for it. […] Fascism does not appear simply because millions of people suddenly become authoritarian and racist. Material conditions create fertile ground: economic crisis, unemployment, impoverishment, the disintegration of workers' organizations, the frustration of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the ambition of the new… Therein lies the link with contemporary Germany and the result obtained by the AfD: this ultra-reactionary party seized upon very real material problems—precarious employment, housing, loss of purchasing power, deterioration of public services—and rearticulated them on an ideological level.” This is the story of the designated enemy: the immigrant, the Muslim, the communist, so that the fundamental contradiction between capital and labor is relegated to the background by a kind of "cultural battle" designed to pit the exploited against each other. […] But the party campaigns against the war, advocates a policy of understanding with Russia, and strongly criticizes the supranational EU, which it advocates leaving. It defends public services, particularly hospitals. Many activists and the majority of voters condemn the genocide in Gaza. And it enjoys overwhelming support in the former GDR. The disappearance of the GDR was a catastrophe. It was an annexation and a colonization. The entire industry of the GDR (the world's seventh- largest economy, for a country of 17 million inhabitants) was dismantled in just a few years. Not to mention the arrogance of the colonizers from West Germany, the West Germans (Wessies) humiliated their "compatriots" in the East for a long time. There is a nostalgia for the old democratic Germany, a country where everyone had a job. For the younger generations who vote for the AfD, this nostalgia sometimes comes at the cost of a complete ignorance of the Nazi danger. While East Germany denazified, this was never the case in the West, and not since the annexation of East Germany. The AfD and its electorate are a hodgepodge, an unlikely cohabitation; clearly, this vote appears much more as a rejection of the German system of governance than an endorsement of the AfD's program .
The state of Berlin
The situation is quite different in the state of the capital city. Nevertheless, the increase in voter turnout there is spectacular, rising from 1,559,228 voters in 2023 (the 2021 elections having been annulled) (62.90%) to 1,846,170 voters (74.62%) in 2026, an increase of 11.72%. It should be noted that the State Council (Landtag) has 130 seats, not 71 as in the two State Councils of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.
The parties of the central bloc lost ground, as in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The coalition of the outgoing mayor-governor, Kai Wegner (CDU), comprised the CDU and the SPD. The CDU obtained 342,516 votes (18.77%) compared to 428,228 votes (28.23%) in 2023, a loss of 9.46%, and its seat count dropped from 52 to 34 (a decrease of eighteen). The SPD obtained 220,939 votes (12.11%) compared to 279,017 votes (18.39%) in 2023, a loss of 6.28%, dropping it from second to fifth place; and its seat count fell from 34 to 22 (a decrease of twelve). The Greens, traditionally based in West Berlin, received 260,700 votes (14.29%) compared to 278,964 votes (18.39%) in 2023, a loss of 4.10%, and their representation dropped from 34 to 26 seats (a decrease of eight). Finally, the FDP obtained 46,341 votes (2.54%) compared to 70,416 votes (4.64%), a loss of 2.10%. Having already failed to gain seats in the Landtag in 2023, they suffered a further decline.
The AfD made progress, but less spectacularly than in the other two states. It obtained 296,601 votes (16.86%) compared to 137,871 (9.09%) in 2023, a gain of 7.79%, and increased its seats from 17 to 29 (an increase of twelve).
The BSW, which did not exist in 2023, received 86,041 votes (4.72%) and therefore did not reach the 5% threshold. The undisputed winner of this election was Die Linke, which obtained 480,060 votes (25.65%) against 185,119 votes (12.20%), a gain of 13.40%, and increased its representation from 22 to 47 seats (an increase of twenty-five). In this analysis, we do not classify Die Linke as part of the centrist bloc due to the specific nature of this organization in Berlin, as illustrated by the themes of its election campaign.
Die Linke, qu'es aquò?
Die Linke is sometimes considered the distant descendant of the SED, the Socialist Unity Party that led democratic Germany from 1949 to 1990. However, this lineage is rather uncertain. In 1990, a number of opponents of the SED leadership, who had taken control during the annexation and counter-revolution, dissolved it and created the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism); a title implying that East German socialism was not democratic. The PDS followed the slippery slope of most former communist parties in Europe in the aftermath of the end of the USSR and the socialist countries of Europe. They became a "left-wing" opposition party, no longer challenging capitalism. Then, they merged with the left wing of the SPD, led by the former Minister-President of Saarland, Oskar Lafontaine, to create the conglomerate known as Die Linke. Sarak Wagenknecht, a member of the Democratic Socialist Party (PDS) and originally from East Germany, later left Die Linke to found her own party, BSW, with two key differences from her former party: a stance in favor of "controlled immigration," very much in keeping with the times, and a firm opposition to the EU and continued support for Ukraine. It should be noted that BSW is the only party in Germany to publicly express solidarity with Palestine.
The entire press, in both France and Germany, labels Die Linke as the "radical left." For the Revolutionary Communist Party, the meaning of the concept of "radical left" is rather vague. In France, it is attributed to La France Insoumise (LFI), whose platform is ten times more right-wing than Mitterrand's in 1981, not to mention Georges Marchais's. In reality, Die Linke is a social-democratic party, using so-called social issues to avoid discussing class struggle, and whose activists and voters are drawn from the middle class.
But Die Linke in Berlin is an exception. It's not so much its lead candidate that illustrates this change. A lawyer, the daughter of Turkish political emigrants who fled Kenan Evren's fascist regime, but belonging to the middle class, Elif Eralp entered activism through the fight against nuclear power. Nothing particularly different from the others. She emphasizes the place of immigrants and anti-racism, but those who, along with her, champion these issues within Die Linke, also come from the middle class. Finally, she lived in West Germany and resides in Kreuzberg, an emblematic district of West Berlin, and has no connection whatsoever with East Germany. Nevertheless, the party recruits partially from working-class circles in Berlin, and, above all, the increase in voter turnout and the majority vote for Die Linke come primarily from the working-class neighborhoods of the East. Committed to fighting the gentrification of the city, she presented a program, championed during the election campaign, focused on access to housing, proposing the municipalization of 220,000 privately owned units, which earned her the staunch opposition of the SPD during the campaign. The emphasis on this proposal resonated far more with workers than with the lower middle class and inevitably played a role in what can be considered a shift in Die Linke's electorate. As we wrote about the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, it is important to separate the motivations of voters from Die Linke's national political program, especially since in Berlin, this program was somewhat different. Die Linke's Berlin activists are more mobilized around solidarity with Palestine than the party is in the rest of the country.
In conclusion
The aftermath of the Berlin election will be closely watched. Will Elif Eralp and Die Linke be able to govern the city? What will the SPD do, having received a barrage of criticism but opposed to the 200,000 municipal housing units? In the event of a "left-wing" government, will Die Linke's program be implemented? What will the workers who voted for them do if it isn't, or even if implementation is only partial? These are all questions worth asking. In any case, there's a resurgence in the working-class vote; when that sentiment is present, it can be useful, probably without any illusions about politicians, including Elif Eralp.
Regarding the election in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, what we said two weeks ago about Saxony-Anhalt remains entirely relevant. This election reveals the current state of affairs. A risk of Nazism's resurgence is undeniable, but it is not necessarily in Germany that it is most advanced; the Baltic states, Estonia, and Ukraine are no less vulnerable. The relentless ideological battle waged by the proponents of Big Capital against Marxism-Leninism has enabled this return to favor. The glorification of Melnyk and Bandera confirms this. It is absolutely essential to understand the connection between this election and the fate of East Germany, and equally so, with the remilitarization of Germany orchestrated by Merz.
Fascism is not a spontaneous phenomenon, much less one that arises outside the class struggle. It is born of bourgeois democracy when Capital needs it. It cannot be fought with grand moral ideas. Nor can it be fought by isolating it from other currents of bourgeois democracy. On the contrary, it can never be fought more effectively than by fighting capitalism and all the ideological currents in its service—fascism and bourgeois democracy simultaneously.